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IMMUNITY FROM STATE TAXATION: WHO IS AN
IMPORTER? VOLKSWAGEN PACIFIC, INC.
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES1
The application of the constitutional prohibition against state taxa-
tion of imports2 involves two considerations: whether or not the party
involved is an "importer" in the constitutional sense,3 and, if this be
the case, whether or not the importer has acted in a fashion which
has caused the goods to lose their "import" status.' It is clear that
imports lose tax immunity after the first sale by an "importer."3'
Therefore, a judicial determination that a party contesting imposition
of a local tax has purchased the goods from an "importer" would
make superfluous any inquiry as to the purchaser's subsequent dispo-
sition of the goods. If the party contesting a local tax is not a consti-
tutional "importer," the constitutional proscription of taxes on imports
simply has no application.0 The constitutional status of the contesting
party is thus the threshold question in import taxation adjudication.
1. 7 Cal. 3d 48, 496 P.2d 1237, 101 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1972).
2. "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties
on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its in-
spection laws." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
The term "import" applies to articles from foreign countries, but not to goods
shipped from one state to another. Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123
(1868). The prohibition applies as long as the goods can be characterized as "im-
ports": "Whilst retaining their character as imports, a tax upon them [imported goods]
in any shape, is within the constitutional prohibition." Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 29, 34 (1871). Such prohibition includes taxing the occupation of importer,
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827); a tax on the sale of imported
goods, Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U.S. 218 (1932); Cook v.
Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566, 573 (1878); an ad valorem tax on imported goods, Hooven
& Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945); a license tax levied on an agent for
steamship lines operating solely in foreign commerce, Tax Review Bd. v. Norton, Lilly,
& Co., 157 A.2d 60 (Pa. 1959); cf. Matson Navigation Co. v. State Bd., 297 U.S.
441 (1936), where a state's corporate franchise tax on the privilege of doing business
within the state, which included profits from foreign commerce in its measure, was
upheld.
I The purpose of the prohibition was to prevent the great importing states from bene-
fiting at the expense of the non-importing states by imposing their own tax on imported
goods eventually destined for the latter. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers,
358 U.S. 534, 545 (1959); Brown v. Maryland, supra at 440.
3. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. at 658.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 656-57.
6. See Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. at 657-58; Waring v. Mayor of Mo-
bile, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 110, 122-23 (1868); 20 WoRDs & PHRAsEs Imports 440 (1955).
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Cases attempting to determine the identity of an importer for tax
immunity purposes have employed two principal criteria for deciding the
question: (1) Was the party in question the "inducing and efficient
cause of. . . importation?"7 (i.e., did his order of goods set in motion
the importation process?) and (2) did he bear the risk of loss during the
shipping process?"
Although the question of the identity of the importer has generated
less litigation than the issue of whether or not goods have lost their
status as imports through the actions of an importer, 9 the recent Califor-
7. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. at 661. See also American Smelting
& Refining Co. v. County of Contra Costa, 271 Cal. App. 2d 437, 446-47, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 570, 575-76 (1969); City of Detroit v. Kenwal Prods. Inc., 165 N.W.2d 875,
876-77 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968).
8. See Waring v. Mayor of Mobile, 75 U.S. at 119-20. Cf. Hooven & Allison Co.
v. Evatt, 324 U.S. at 662-63, 663 n.4; American Smelting & Refining Co. v. County of
Contra Costa, 271 Cal. App. 2d 437, 446-47, 77 Cal. Rptr. 570, 575-76 (1969).
9. This Note will discuss the problem of identifying the importer for tax immunity
purposes. The other problem, deciding when an article ceases to be an import, is one
which has generated much litigation and commentary, and will not be discussed fully
here. Generally, however, the problem is whether or not the goods in question have
lost their character as imports. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827),
the seminal case on state taxation of imports, is the starting point for any consideration
of this problem. In that case, Chief Justice Marshall noted that it was not possible
to lay down a strict rule specifying when goods lose their character as imports, but
suggested that
[w]hen the importer has so acted upon the thing imported, that it has become
incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it has per-
haps, lost its distinctive character as an import, and has become subject to the
taxing power of the State, but while remaining the property of the importer, in
his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was imported, a tax
upon it is too plainly a duty on imports to escape the prohibition in the constitu-
tion.
Id. at 441-42. This statement has produced the so-called "package doctrine," as one
way of determining whether or not an article is still to be considered an import. Es-
sentially, when an article is shipped in a package, it retains its immunity from state
taxation while still in the hands of the importer and in the original package: "[G]oods
imported do not lose their character as imports . . . until they have passed from the
control of the importer or been broken up by him from their original cases." Low
v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29, 34 (1871). Though the package doctrine is meant
as a test and not as an absolute indicator of the presence or absence of tax immunity
(Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 526-27 (1935) ), it has been decisive in many cases.
E.g., Low v. Austin, supra; F. May & Co. v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496 (1900).
Since the package doctrine is only one indicator, the more general inquiry becomes
whether or not "the importer has so acted upon the thing imported, that it has . . .
lost its distinctive character as an import." Brown v. Maryland, supra at 441-42.
When the package doctrine does not apply, the test becomes whether or not the goods
have been sold by the original importer or put to the use for which they were im-
ported:
[Tihings imported are imports entitled to the immunity conferred by the Constitu-
tion; that... immunity survives... until they are sold, removed from the origi-
nal package, or put to the use for which they are imported.
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nia Supreme Court case of Volkswagen Pacific, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles'0 should give rise to new concern over the problem. In a hold-
ing noticeably lacking in supportive facts, the court found that a party
who bore risk of loss, but was not, from all appearances, the "inducing
and efficient cause" of the importation was nevertheless the importer."
In so doing, the California court limited the latter criterion to a "broker,"
or agency, situation. This Note will evaluate the significance of such
distinctions in light of prior decisions and will also attempt to illuminate
the possible bases of the court's decision.
I. THE SUPREME COURT CASES
Only two United States Supreme Court cases have extensively dis-
cussed the identity of an importer for purposes of the import-export
clause.12 In the first of these, Waring v. Mayor of Mobile,1 3 the plain-
tiff was a salt merchant, buying large quantities of that commodity
from overseas suppliers. Waring's purchase contracts were usually
made before the salt -arrived in this country, but often after it had
left the foreign port.' 4 When the salt reached the port of Mobile,
Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. at 657. As the above quote indicates, the
mere fact that an article is in its original package does not insure tax exemption. See
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 548 (1959). For example,
it has been held that the second sale of an imported article within this country is tax-
able, even though the article may be in the original package. Waring v. Mayor of
Mobile, 75 U.S. at 122-23.
The "put to the use for which imported" test is another complex aspect of import
tax immunity. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, supra, it was held that
goods stored by petitioners prior to their use in manufacturing had been put to the
use for which they were imported, in a situation where they were essential to current
manufacturing needs. See note 26 infra. For more on the problem of when goods
lose their tax immunity, see Bradley, State Taxing Power: An Accomodation of
State and Federal Powers, 34 NoTRE DAME LAW. 593 (1960); Glander, Practical Ap-
proach to the Tax Immunity of Imports For Use in Manufacturing, 18 NAT'L TAX J.
328 (1965); Powell, When Does an Import Cease to Be an Import?, 58 HARV. L. REV.
858 (1945); Annot., 26 A.L.R. 971 (1923).
10. 7 Cal. 3d 48, 496 P.2d 1237, 101 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1972).
11. The basis for the court's holding that the petitioner was not an importer is un-
clear; even risk of loss was not expressly or impliedly mentioned as a basis of decision.
See text accompanying notes 100-02 infra.
12. Though some cases have discussed the concept of importer in the context of in-
terstate commerce as if the problem were the same for foreign commerce in the import-
export clause (see, e.g., State v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 78 P.2d 1090 (Wash. 1938) ),
the situation is not the same. American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U.S. 500,
519-21 (1904); Washington Chocolate Co. v. King County, 152 P.2d 981, 990-91
(Wash. 1944); see note 2 supra.
13. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 110 (1868),
14. at l1_-11,
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Waring's own lighters removed it from the ships and carried it to
shore.'" The shippers, however, paid the customs duties, satisfied
other formal requirements,"" and assumed the risk of loss throughout
the journey until the cargo was delivered to Waring's boats.'1 The
city levied a tax on local merchants, measured by the amount of gross
sales,' s which Waring refused to pay. He challenged the constitution-
ality of the tax, asserting that his sales were entitled to the protection
of the import-export clause because they involved imported goods. 9
The Supreme Court, emphasizing the fact that risk of loss remained
with the shipper until delivery to Waring, 20 found that Waring was
not the "importer" of the goods. 2 ' Therefore, he was compelled to
pay the tax:
Importers selling the imported articles in the original packages are
shielded from any such State tax, but the privilege of exemption is not
extended to the purchaser [from -the importer], as the merchandise,
by the sale and delivery, loses its distinctive character as an import.
22
Though the Court emphasized the risk of loss as the determinative
factor, the facts of the case also reveal that Waring often did not con-
tract for the salt until it had already been shipped. 3 Thus either the
shipper or his consignee necessarily assumed the risk of loss during
shipment, since no other party was yet involved at the time the goods
began their journey. It is clear, therefore, that Waring not only failed
to assume the risk of loss, but also was not the cause of importation.24
The Waring court explicitly refrained from relying upon this considera-
tion, however, explaining that:
[Whether -the contracts to purchase were made before or after the
vessel arrived in the bay is quite immaterial, as the agreement was,
that the risk should continue to be in the owner or consignees until
15. Id. at 116. Because of the nature of the harbor it was necessary for shallow
draft vessels to carry cargo from sea-going ships to shore. Id. at 115.
16. Id. at 119.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 111.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 119-20.
21. Id. at 120.
22. Id. at 123.
23. Id. at 116, 119-20.
24. After mentioning risk of loss, the Court discussed passage of title (id. at 119-
20), and it noted that the consignees entered the goods at the customs house and paid
the duties. Id. at 116. Under the customs law of that time, this tended to indicate
ownership of the goods. Id. at 116-19. This treatment of the two factors of risk of
loss and passage of title reflects traditional sales law. See note 48 infra.
1974]
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they delivered the salt into the complainant's lighters, alongside of the
Vessel. 2
5
The emphasis shifted in Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt,20 the only
other Supreme Court case to discuss the identity of the importer for
tax immunity purposes. There, the plaintiff company ordered hemp
and other fibers from foreign producers through the medium of inde-
pendent brokers.2 7  After delivery, the fibers were stored in their orig-
inal packages in the plaintiff's warehouse until he used them in the
manufacture of cordage. 8 The state of Ohio imposed an ad valorem
tax29 on the stored fibers, which the plaintiff claimed was in violation
of the constitutional ban on state taxation of imports.30 The Ohio Su-
preme Court, believing that the facts were analogous to those in War-
ing, concluded that the foreign producers or their agents were the im-
porters, not the company, and that the "sale" to Hooven & Allison
destroyed the "import" character of the goods."' Consequently, the
state tax was valid.
32
The United States Supreme Court, in its own examination of the
25. Id. at 119.
26. 324 U.S. 652 (1945). The case also involved the contention that the goods had,
since their arrival in the country, lost their immunity from state taxation by being put
to the use for which they were imported. See note 9 supra. The Court held that
they had not. 324 U.S. at 667. Subsequently, in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co.
v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534 (1959), the Court held that certain imported articles stored
in the manufacturer's warehouse prior to their use in the manufacturing process
had been put to the use for which they were imported and had consequently lost
their tax immunity. Id. at 548. The majority distinguished Hooven & Allison by
saying that the goods in that case had not been essential to the current manufacturing
needs of the petitioner. Id. at 544-47. A strong dissent in Youngstown claimed that
the majority had not sufficiently distinguished Hooven & Allison and "the situation
there involved so precisely parallels the circumstances now before us as to control
these cases, unless Hooven & Allison is to be overruled." Id. at 561. Youngstown did
not, however, involve the problem of identifying the importer, for which Hooven &
Allison has been cited here, and the latter case is still the latest Supreme Court decision
on this issue.
27. 324 U.S. at 659.
28. Id. at 654.
29. "The phrase 'ad valorem' means literally 'according to the value,' and is used
in taxation to designate an assessment of taxes against property at a certain rate upon
its value." 2A WoRDs & PnRAsEs Ad Valorem 105 (1955).
30. 324 U.S. at 655.
31. Id.
32. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court also felt that even if the petitioner were the im-
porter, the goods had lost their immunity when they were stored in petitioner's ware-
house awaiting manufacture. 51 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ohio 1943). The United States
Supreme Court found that the goods had not lost their immunity. 324 U.S. at 666-67.
See notes 9 & 26 supra.
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facts, 33 found that the petitioner, Hooven & Allison, contracted for its
requirements through independent corporate brokers, who signed the
contracts as "agent for" the foreign producer. 4 The price included
the cost of the goods, freight charges, the cost of insurance, and cus-
toms duties.35  Payment was made to the broker after delivery to the
petitioner.3" The sales were on the unsecured credit of the company,
and neither the brokers nor the producers retained a security interest
in the goods, although the producer did retain the right to stop the
goods in transit. 37  On the arrival of the merchandise, the broker
would enter it at the customs house in its own name and arrange
for shipment to the company's plant.38  The Court felt that, consider-
ing this process as a whole, it was the petitioner-company which gen-
erated the importation:
From all this it is clear that from the beginning, after the contract of
purchase is signed, the foreign producer is obligated to sell the mer-
chandise . . ship it to an American port and to deliver it to peti-
tioner . . . . Performance of the contract calls for, and necessarily re-
sults in, importation of the merchandise . . . . Petitioner's contracts of
purchase are the inducing and efficient cause of bringing the merchan-
dise into the country, which is importation.3 9
Clearly, the nature of the transaction in Hooven & Allison allowed
the plaintiff company to resell the goods while in transit and required
it to bear risk of loss, at least as to changes in market value.40 But
the fact that certain contingencies might have prevented the plaintiff
from taking possession 4' was regarded as a factor common to most
importation transactions and not inconsistent with a conclusion that the
plaintiff company was an importer.42 The lack of formal passage of
title in the goods prior to shipment also was deemed irrelevant. 43  No
difference was perceived between credit transactions, whether secured
33. The Supreme Court declared that the state authorities had given insufficient con-
sideration to the facts of the transactions, and that since "the existence of an asserted
federal right or immunity" depended on these facts, the Court should examine the
facts on its own.' 324 U.S. at 659.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 660.
36. Id. at 661.
37. Id. at 661-62.
38. Id. at 661.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. Id. See note 99 infra.
41. 324 U.S. at 662.
42. Id.
43. ld. at 662-63, 663 n.4.
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by purchasers' liens or unsecured, and situations in which a company
actually completed the purchase in the foreign country and thereafter
shipped the goods to the United States. 4  Because the company was
the "efficient cause '4 5 of importation, and because the "extent of...
immunity from state taxation turns on the essential nature of the trans-
action . . . and not on the formalities . . . or on the technical proce-
dures"46 followed, the company was classified as an "importer."
Thus, the two principal cases discussing the definition of the term
"importer" proceeded from significantly different perspectives. War-
ing emphasized risk of loss; Hooven & Allison subordinated the risk
of loss factor to a more general test: whether or not the involved
party was the inducing and efficient cause of importation. 47  Conse-
quently, after Hooven & Allison, risk of loss was at best a factor rele-




Since Hooven & Allison, only four reported cases from state courts49
44. Id. at 663-64.
45. Id. at 661.
46. Id. at 663.
47. Id. at 662-63, 663 n.4.
48. Although risk of loss is traditionally related to passage of title, they do not nec-
essarily go hand in hand, for parties to a transaction can vary the risk according to
their needs and desires. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY §§
3-6, 3-7 (1957); 2 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOvERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON
LAW AND UNDER T=E UNIFORM SALEs AcT §§ 301-02 (rev. ed. 1948). The Uniform
Commercial Code replaces the traditional passage of title approach with a contractual
approach emphasizing the intent of the parties. The parties to a sales agreement may
still modify the allocation of risk of loss between themselves in any way they desire.
1 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-502:2-:3 (1961).
49. The problem of identifying the importer also arises in the federal context. The
prohibition on taxing imports, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2, plainly applies only to
the states, and not the federal government. But, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 gives
the federal government the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations," which
enables it to tax imports, and levy an excise tax on the first sale of goods made by
an importer. See Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570, 574 (1931).
For federal tax purposes, the leading case on the subject defines the importer as "the
first purchaser resident in the United States who arranges (as principal and not as an
agent) for the goods to be brought into the United States." Handley Motor Co. v.
United States, 338 F.2d 361, 364 (Ct. Cl. 1964). If this definition were employed
in a situation such as Waring (where for purposes of the state tax the shippers or
their consignees were held to be the importers (75 U.S. at 120) ), a United States
resident, not the importer for state tax immunity purposes, might nevertheless be liable
for the federal tax on his first sale of the imports. In such a case, the citizen would
probably have to pay both taxes. The federal government may control foreign com-
356 [Vol. 7
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have discussed the identity of the importer for state tax immunity pur-
poses." Two of these cases, involving similar facts, were decided by
state courts in Michigan.
In City of Detroit v. Kenwal Products, Inc.,51 eleven Detroit steel
merce, but the power of the states to tax persons and property within their boundaries
is an inherent power, limited only by what is constitutionally prohibited. Thomson
v. Pacific R.R., 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 579, 591 (1869); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 361, 429 (1819). As a result, if a party is not an importer within the
import-export clause ban on state taxes, it would appear that the imposition of a
federal tax on the first sale of an imported article by the same party would not pro-
hibit the state from exercising its power to tax.
In the case of an excise tax, there is no question, assuming there is going to be
a sale in this country, that a tax will be imposed; the only question is who is liable
for it. This is in contrast to some import-export situations where a finding of immunity
might avoid the tax entirely; for example, if an ad valorem tax (see note 29 supra)
is invalid as a tax on imports, the party could avoid the tax entirely, and it would
not be passed on. In any event, the fact that one party pays the excise tax does not
seem to influence the decision of who the importer is for state purposes, and the courts
have not discussed the problem.
As the quotation from Handley, supra, indicates, federal courts seek to identify the ac-
tual importer, rather than a mere agent, and the federal cases often cite Hooven &
Allison when making this determination. See, e.g., Import Wholesalers Corp. v. United
States, 368 F.2d 577, 584 (Ct. Cl. 1966). Nevertheless, the issue is, as indicated, dif-
ferent for federal purposes, and Hooven & Allison is not directly applicable. At least
one recent federal case which determined the identity of the importer did not even
cite Hooven & Allison (Sony Corp. of America v. United States, 428 F.2d 1258
(Ct. Cl. 1970)), and another, which paid lip service to Hooven & Allison, actually
turned on interpretation of federal statutes and technical passage of title. Weiner v.
United States, 261 F. Supp. 413 (C.D. Cal. 1966).
50. There were likewise few cases between Waring and Hooven & Allison, and noth-
ing of analytical import. In Johnson v. Los Angeles County, 3 Cal. App. 2d 579,
88 P.2d 725 (1939), the basis for upholding the plaintiff's claim that he was the im-
porter, although not clearly enunciated, appeared to be based on the fact that it ob-
tained title upon shipment of the goods by the foreign supplier and still retained title
and possession at the time the tax was imposed.
There is one other post-Hooven & Allison case which discussed the importer ques-
tion. In Cominco Prods., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 P.2d 85 (Ore. 1966), the
court stated that "the person who makes the entry, pays the duty, etc. . . . is the im-
porter." Id. at 88. Aside from the fact that such a simplified approach ignored Hoo-
yen & Allison, the Oregon court did not cite authority to support this statement. The
pivotal issue in the case was not the identity of the importer, for it was conceded that
the plaintiff was the importer; the question was whether or not goods retain their im-
munity from state taxation when the importer transfers them on consignment to retail
dealers. Id. at 85. The statement, therefore, is not a conclusion of law and amounts
to no more than dicta. It may have resulted from a misinterpretation of certain Su-
preme Court cases which said that payment of duties gives the right to sell imported
goods free from state taxation. E.g., May v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496, 507 (1900);
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 442 (1827). However, these cases did
not consider the problem of identifying the importer, and they do not presume that
the one who pays the duties is the importer.
51. 165 N.W.2d 875 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833 (1969).
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warehousing companies appealed the assessment of property taxes on
imported steel stored prior to sale. 2 The city claimed that the domes-
tic corporate intermediaries, through which the companies had ordered
the steel, and not the petitioners, were the importers.13 The Michigan
court, 'after citing extensively from Hooven & Allison, noted several
similarities in the two cases: both ordered through domestic interme-
diaries, a comprehensive purchase price was involved, and the goods
were marked as belonging to ,the petitioner companies prior to ship-
ment. 54
In contrast to Hooven & Allison, the intermediaries here signed con-
tracts with the foreign producers, not as "agent for" the company, but
in their own corporate name.55 The petitioner companies entered into
contracts directly with the domestic intermediaries, paying them and
not the foreign producer.5 6 The Michigan court, however, relied on
the Supreme Court's instruction that where performance of a contract
necessarily resulted in importation, the contracting party is the "effi-
cient cause" thereof, and is thus the importer. 57  Not only did it ig-
nore the attribution of risk of loss, but the court also did not discuss
any aspects of physical control of the goods by the importer. The
party who effectively caused the order and subsequent importation was
declared to be the importer.5"
Further evidence of the willingness of a Michigan court to look past
formalities in determining the identity of an importer came in 1971,
in Socomet v. City of Detroit.9 Socomet ordered foreign-made steel
either through a sister corporation or through a company acting as its
agent. 6 The court concluded that these two corporate intermediaries
were in fact -agents of Socomet and not themselves the importers, rely-
ing on factors indicating Socomet was the inducing cause of the impor-
tation. It specified the types of steel to be imported, dictated the
timing and quantity of -the orders, and generally exercised control over
the goods and their handling. 61 This included control of the title
52. 165 N.W.2d at 876.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 877.
55. Compare 165 N.W.2d at 877 with 324 U.S. at 661. Note that the Kenwal court
said that in Hooven & Allison payment was made directly to the foreign producer, but
the Supreme Court opinion indicates otherwise.
56. See note 55 supra.
57. 165 N.W.2d at 877.
58. Id.
59. 190 N.W.2d 551 (Mich. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1024 (1971).
60. 190 N.W.2d at 552-53.
61. Id. qt 552-54, ,
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documents, in contrast with Kenwal where such control was not always
present.0 2 The risk of loss aspect was not mentioned, but the fact
that either Socomet or its corporate parent financed the transactions,
and that the intermediaries never claimed any title in the merchandise,
indicate that the risk probably rested with Socomet .
3
The third state case discussing the importer question, American
Smelting and Refining Co. v. County of Contra Costa," is a California
appellate decision which predates Volkswagen by three years but was
not cited in that case. The company there protested a county tax on
imported ore which it had stored prior to smelting.6 5 Its general prac-
tice was to process the ore before selling the refined metals to domes-
tic manufacturers. 66 The county apparently argued that since "'pos-
session and risk of loss'" (not "ownership") passed to American
Smelting only when the ore arrived at its California facility, the foreign
producer was really the importer.67  Waring was the county's most di-
rect authority for this proposition. 8 The court answered simply by
quoting the Hooven & Allison admonition that if performance of a con-
tract necessarily results in importation, then the contracting party is
the "inducing and efficient cause" thereof, and hence the importer.6 9
Once again, a court looked beyond the technical form of the con-
tract and formulated its decision in light of the essential nature of
the transaction.70 "Risk of loss" was clearly regarded as subordinate
to the determination of "efficient cause."
Ill. THE VOLKSWAGEN CASE
A. Background and Facts7'
Volkswagen Pacific, Inc. (hereinafter VW) and Porsche Car Dis-
62. Compare 190 N.W.2d at 552 with 165 N.W.2d at 877.
63. 190 N.W.2d at 552-53.
64. 271 Cal. App. 2d 437, 77 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S.
273 (1970).
65. 271 Cal. App. 2d at 442, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 446, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 446-47, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 579. The identity of the importer was not, how-
ever, the only issue bearing on the plaintiff's tax liability in this complex and lengthy
decision, and most of the goods in question were eventually found subject to the tax.
Id. at 440-41, 488, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 575-76, 605.
70. See 271 Cal. App. 2d at 443-44 & nn.5-6, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 576-77 & nn.5-6.
71. There were actually two intermediate appellate court opinions, only one of which
was published. The trial court verdict was affirmed in an opinion appearing at 90
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tributors, Inc. (hereinafter Porsche) are related, but separate, corpora-
tions which distribute Volkswagen and Porsche automobiles and parts
in the Los Angeles area.7" VW ordered its cars and parts from Volks-
wagen of America, a New Jersey corporation which was the wholly
owned subsidiary and "franchised sales agent" of the German manu-
facturer.71 VW and Volkswagen of America had a franchise agree-
ment which granted VW an exclusive territory for distribution. The
agreement dictated a process for ordering automobiles as follows:
VW, after receiving order cards from its dealers in turn placed the
order for these cars and for autos for its own inventory with Volks-
wagen of America; Volkswagen of America then ordered the neces-
sary cars from the manufacturer. 74  When the shipment left Germany,
Volkswagen of America notified VW. When it arrived at the port
of Los Angeles, an agent of Volkswagen of America accomplished
the necessary processing and only at this time did VW pay Volkswagen
of America for the goods.75
The importation of Porsche automobiles differed in a fairly signifi-
cant fashion. Porsche ordered directly from the German manufacturer
and paid for the automobiles and parts prior to shipment, which relieved
the manufacturer of any risk of loss during the shipping process. 70
Interestingly, VW was the "importer of record" and it actually paid
the manufacturer and attended to other details of delivery.77  Porsche
reimbursed VW for its actual expenses, in addition to a $75 per car
service fee, after the automobiles arrived. 71
B. The California Supreme Court Opinion
The suit arose as the result of the levy of a City of Los Angeles
business license tax,79 measured by gross sales receipts. VW and
Cal. Rptr. 902 (1970), an opinion vacated when the state supreme court granted a
hearing. See note 87 infra. The supreme court subsequently transferred the case back
to the appellate court for a redetermination of the apportionment of the tax assessment.
Respondent's Petition for Hearing at 5, Volkswagen Pac., Inc. v. City of Los Ange-
les, 7 Cal. 3d 48, 496 P.2d 1237, 101 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1972). The opinion for this
second appellate decision was adopted in large part by the supreme court as its opin-
ion. 7 Cal. 3d at 51, 496 P.2d at 1239, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 871. For the purposes
of this Note, the first appellate opinion (90 Cal. Rptr. 902) is that to which reference
is made when the "court of appeal opinion" is cited.
72. 7 Cal. 3d at 52, 496 P.2d at 1240, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 52-53, 496 P.2d at 1240-41, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73.
76. 90 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Th6 tax in question was imposed under § 21.167 of the L.A., CAL., MUN.
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Porsche paid the tax 0 and then sued to have it declared invalid, claim:
ing that they were the "inducing and efficient cause" of the importa-
tion,81 and were therefore protected by the constitutional prohibition
of state or local taxation of imports."2 This argument was summarily
dismissed by the supreme court:
[VW's] reliance [on -this rationale] is misplaced. The brokerage situa-
tion [in Hooven & Allison] is distinguishable from the case at bench.
In the case of a purchase through a broker, there is no local sale ....
Here there is. Volkswagen of America acts for its own account as
a seller to VW and not as an intermediary in a transaction between
the German manufacturer and VW.83
The supreme court, primarily resting on the trial court's finding and
the stipulation of facts on which the case was tried, concluded that
Volkswagen of America, and not VW, was the importer.8 4  VW's
claimed immunity ceased, in the court's opinion, following a "sale"
between Volkswagen of America and VW,85 and thus VW's sales to
dealers in Los Angeles were properly taxed.
Prior to any discussion of the wisdom of this conclusion, two prelim-
CODE (1936), as amended, (Ord. 140,833, Jan. 1, 1971). This section imposes
a "business tax" measured by gross receipts from sales within the city. VW and
Porsche claimed refunds for taxes paid in 1963 through 1967, amounting to $44,404.50
for VW and $4,157.20 for Porsche. Appellants' Brief at 12-16, Volkswagen Pac., Inc.
v. City of Los Angeles, 7 Cal. 3d 48, 496 P.2d 1237, 101 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1972).
80. 7 Cal. 3d at 54, 496 P.2d at 1241-42, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 873-74. The fact that
such a tax would be invalid if VW were the importer and if the goods had retained
their character as imports was not challenged. A tax measured by the amount of im-
ported goods sold is a tax on the sale, and the first sale by an importer may not be
taxed. See note 2 supra.
81. 7 Cal. 3d at 56-57, 496 P.2d at 1243-44, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 875-76.
82. Id. at 54, 496 P.2d at 1241-42, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 873-74.
83. Id. at 57, 496 P.2d at 1244, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 876 (footnote omitted).
84. Id. at 56, 496 P.2d at 1243, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
85. Id. This is of course true only if Volkswagen of America was an importer in
the constitutional sense. The court was not specific as to the effect on the auto parts,
but presumably the same analysis applies.
The case also involved the argument that even if the plaintiffs were the importers,
the goods had nevertheless lost their immunity. The court held that when the sea vans
containing the parts were opened with the intent to sell the parts, and when the aggre-
gate of imported automobiles was broken up by removing automobiles from it, the
goods lost their tax immunity. Id. at 55-56, 496 P.2d at 1242-43, 101 Cal. Rptr. at
874-75. The holding in regard to the sea vans represents an expansion of the package
doctrine (see note 9 supra) which may have a significant effect on California import-
ers using this type of container. See Auerbach, State Importers to Get Tax Prize in
Every Box, L.A. Times, Apr. 1, 1973, § 9, at 1, col. 1. For a Michigan case with
a different result on similar facts, see Tax Comm'n v. Garment Corp. of America, 189
N.W.2d 72 (Mich. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 992 (1971).
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inary observations should be noted. First, the court of appeal previ-
ously had concluded that Porsche was in fact the importer of Porsche
automobiles and parts; s6 the supreme court did not discuss this issue
of Porsche-as-importer and thus impliedly accepted this conclusion.
8 7
Second, the court erred in its analytical approach to the entire question
of immunity from state taxation. Instead of resolving identity of the
importer as the prerequisite before considering the issue of why the
goods were no longer "imports," the court first determined that the auto-
mobiles were no longer in their "original packages" and thus were sub-
ject to the state tax.88  The "importer" aspects were seemingly used as
added support for sustaining the tax, whereas logically, and according
,to Hooven & Allison, an initial focus on -the importer issue and a subse-
quent determination that VW was not the "importer" would have ob-
viated any need to consider the "original package" question.8
Since neither the Michigan cases nor American Smelting bind the
California Supreme 'Court90 and since they apparently were not even
considered, the validity of the court's determination of importer identity
rests on whether or not the facts and analysis can be reconciled with
Hooven & Allison. In both Hooven & Allison and Volkswagen, there
was an intermediary who forwarded the orders of a domestic corpora-
tion to a foreign supplier. VW ordered the automobiles and parts
of the German manufaoturer for its business of selling these items
through individual dealers, just as the Hooven & Allison company or-
dered raw materials for its business of manufacturing.0' It was VW
and not Volkswagen of America which maintained an inventory of au-
tomobiles to supply its individual dealers, 92 just as Hooven & Allison
86. 90 Cal. Rptr. at 910-11. The court of appeal felt that if Porsche alone had
been involved in the transaction, its activities clearly supported a conclusion that it
was the importer. The activities of its sister corporation, VW, as "importer of record,"
did not alter this conclusion because examination of the realities of VW's and Porsche's
operation disclosed that VW had no connection with Porsche products other than per-
forming the "importer of record" services. Id. at 909. See text accompanying notes
77-78 supra. Consequently, the court determined that VW was merely an "agent" of
Porsche. 90 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
87. This is not meant to imply that the appellate court's decision is still "good law"
-it is not. When a case is transferred from a district court of appeal to the supreme
court, the decision of the court of appeal is vacated and considered a nullity. Ponce
v. Marr, 47 Cal. 2d 159, 301 P.2d 837 (1956). See note 101 infra and accompanying
text.
88. 7 Cal. 3d at 56, 496 P.2d at 1243, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 875. See note 85 supra.
89. 324 U.S. at 657-58. The court of appeal in Volkswagen did use the correct ap-
proach, at least in regard to Porsche. See 90 Cal. Rptr. at 908-10.
90. See note 101 infra and accompanying text.
91. See text accompanying notes 27-29 and 72-75 supra.
92. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
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maintained an inventory of fibers for its manufacturing needs. Both
VW and Hooven & Allison made their contracts of purchase with the
intermediary in the ordinary course of their businessY3 According to
the theory expressed by the Supreme Court in Hooven & Allison and
in the subsequent state cases, it would appear that VW (or in many
cases the dealers) was the party who "induced" the importation of
Volkswagen products-Volkswagen of America would not have acted
to forward the orders if VW had not placed them. Nevertheless, the
California court decided differently, but provided no precise enumera-
tion of facts to support its conclusion that Volkswagen of America in-
stead of VW was the importer. 4 There is one fact, however, unex-
pressed in the supreme court decision, which arguably could have been
employed as the basis for the opinion: the "risk of loss" factor.
The record indicated that risk of loss did not transfer from Volks-
wagen of America to VW until the goods had arrived and a "marine
insurance survey" was conducted to determine the extent of any dam-
age claimed by VW." As stated previously, Hooven & Allison
acknowledged that risk of loss was 'one factor to be considered in
resolving the central question, namely, who caused the goods to be
shipped into the country."' As the Kenwal court recognized, Hooven
& Allison emphasized the fact that the Hooven & Allison company's
orders generated the importation transactions, even in a situation
where the "agent" was ostensibly an independent corporation acting
as principal. 7 Though risk of loss could have been used in an attempt
to distinguish the Volkswagen case from Hooven & Allison, even that
difference could not be justified. Subsequent to Waring, both Hooven
& Allison and American Smelting involved situations where the pur-
chaser who placed the order did not bear the risk of loss which might
ensue from physical destruction of the goods while in transit. The
Supreme Court in Hooven & Allison apparently dismissed the risk of
loss in Waring as a mere technicality of passage of title9 8 and did not
discuss or emphasize the fact that Hooven & Allison bore only the risk of
93. See text accompanying notes 27-28 and 74 supra. The United States Supreme
Court in Hooven & Allison placed some emphasis on this factor. 324 U.S. at 661.
94. 7 Cal. 3d at 57, 496 P.2d at 1243, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 875. See note 118 supra
and text accompanying notes 27-29 and 72-75 supra.
95. Record, Volkswagen Pac., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, Docket # 29842, Exhibit
A at 29-30 [hereinafter cited as Record].
96. See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
97. See text accompanying notes 55-58 supra.
98. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
1974]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
a change of market value in the goods it had ordered.00 The American
Smelting court distinguished Waring on the ground that the purchaser's
orders there had not induced the importation and concluded that the
source of the order was a more important consideration than risk of
loss.' 00 American Smelting was not discussed in Volkswagen, and since
it was a district court of appeal decision, there obviously was no necessity
to do so.1°1 The facts in the case differed in that the purchaser apparent-
ly ordered directly from the owners of the goods, rather than through
intermediaries. 102  Nevertheless, the case demonstrated an understand-
ing of the principles of Hooven & Allison and put risk of loss in the
proper perspective.
From a practical standpoint, risk of loss is a poor indicator for decid-
ing who caused the importation. It is obviously a matter which can
be bargained for between the parties to an import transaction and,
therefore, might not reflect the actual source of the order.'03 For ex-
ample, in the transactions of the Volkswagen case, VW paid the insur-
ance premiums for Porsche's goods as well as for those which it or-
dered for itself. In the event of loss the proceeds would go to VW,
who would then distribute the funds.' 0 4 Yet, the court of appeal made
clear that Porsche bore risk of loss.' 0 5 It was also specified that in
the case of cars ordered by dealers, VW was to pay the insurance
proceeds to the dealer, indicating that in such cases the dealer may
have borne the risk of loss.'06 These considerations suggest the inad-
visability of basing tax liability on technical aspects of the import
transactions, be they risk of loss or passage of title, and indicate the
wisdom of the court in Hooven & Allison when it looked past the tech-
nicalities of the transactions to identify the "inducing and efficient
cause" of the importation.
But the California Supreme Court did not attempt to rely on a risk
of loss analysis, nor did it find Hooven & Allison to be controlling.
99. 324 U.S. at 662. The Ohio court clearly stated that Hooven & Allison bore no
risk attendant to physical destruction of the goods. 51 N.E.2d at 724.
100. See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra.
101. See, e.g., Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 472, 283 P.2d 19, 24 (1955);
Shelton v. City of Los Angeles, 206 Cal. 544, 550, 275 P. 421, 425 (1929). The
law pronounced by a district court of appeal is not binding on the supreme court, even
if the supreme court had denied a petition for hearing on the matter. 6 B. WITKIN,
CAr.womNrA PROCEDURE 4580-84 (2d ed. 1971).
102. 271 Cal. App. 2d at 442-43, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 576-77.
103. See note 48 supra.
104. Record, supra note 95, at 123.
105. 90 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
106. Record, supra note 95, at 123.
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Instead, it distinguished Hooven & Allison on the basis that a "sale"
was present in Volkswagen, with Volkswagen of America character-
ized as the "seller.' 10 7 Additionally, the court impliedly restricted the
"inducing and efficient cause" test to what it termed the "broker" sit-
uation, that is, where an intermediary acting as agent is interposed
between the claimed importer and the foreign producer.10 8  By mak-
ing such distinctions, the supreme court has misconstrued the United
States Supreme Court's clearly manifested intent -that the formal as-
pects of an importation transaction, especially "technical questions of
passage of title,"'1 9 should not be controlling when determining the
issue of importer identity for tax immunity purposes."'
1. "Sale"
While imported goods lose their tax immunity after the first sale
by an importer,"' a distinction based on the intermediary in the trans-
action acting as a "seller" avoids the main issue: identity of the im-
porter. Only a sale by an importer terminates the tax immunity of
imported goods." 2  The mere fact that an intermediary "sells" goods
to the party which placed the order does not in itself identify the seller
as the importer. The Court in Hooven & Allison easily could have
found a "sales" transaction but declined to attach any importance to
the question.
In Hooven & Allison, the broker who acted as the intermediary be-
tween the company and the foreign producer received the contract
price only upon delivery to the purchaser's plant." 3 Also, the brokers
received payment for the goods directly from the purchaser" 4 and
derived a profit from the transaction." 5  Title to the goods did not
pass to Hooven & Allison until they were actually delivered by the
broker." 6 The Supreme Court had additional facts before it, not in-
eluded in its opinion, which were even more persuasive of a sale be-
tween the broker and Hooven & Allison." 7 Yet, the Court apparently
107. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
108. Id.
109. 324 U.S. at 662-63.
110. Id. at 663.
111. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
112. Id.
113. 324 U.S. at 661.
114. Id. at 661; 51 N.E.2d at 725.
115. The brokers received commissions from the foreign producers (51 N.E.2d at
726) and nothing from Hooven & Allison. Id. at 724.
116. See 324 U.S. at 662-63.
117. In the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion (51 N.E.2d 723 (Ohio 1943)), it was
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did not deem such facts important, as evidenced by the lack of discus-
sion of these factors. This appears to be a salutary approach because
for purposes of the import-export clause, the quest is only for the party
whose actions set in motion the process which results in goods entering
the United States. The formal, legal capacity which this "importer"
adopts is largely irrelevant if there exist factors which clearly demon-
strate that without his demand for a product, the importation process
would not have occurred."'!8
noted that one of the brokers with whom Hooven & Allison had dealings testified that
prior to 1941, it had signed its contracts with the company as principal and not as
agent. Id. at 726. The Ohio court inferred from this fact that, since the taxable years
in question, 1938-40, included these "principal" contracts, Hooven & Allison was not
the importer but rather the first purchaser from the true importer, the broker. Id. at
725. The United States Supreme Court had these facts before it (324 U.S. at 659),
but did not feel bound by such a general statement of technical factors in ascertaining
who was the "inducing and efficient cause" of the importation.
The California Supreme Court's language to the effect that "Volkswagen of America
acts for its own account as a seller to VW" (7 Cal. 3d at 57, 496 P.2d at 1244,
101 Cal. Rptr. at 876), appears to be derived from the vacated court of appeal opinion
(90 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1970) ), and the.Record, supra note 95, Exhibit A at 29. The
lower court noted that the foreign supplier itself became obligated to Hooven & Alli-
son, because the broker there signed "for account of" the supplier, whereas Volkswagen
of America signed as "seller." 90 Cal. Rptr. at 910. Whether or not the Supreme
Court used the terminology of the foreign producer's "obligation" to the Hooven & Alli-
son company (324 U.S. at 661) as one of the definitive criteria for a finding that
a party is an importer is unclear. Existence of an obligation between parties to a con-
tract gives them legal rights in case of a breach (see BLACK'S LAW DICaroNARY 1223-
24, 1226 (4th ed. 1951) ), and this seemed to be the prime concern of the court of
appeal. 90 Cal. Rptr. at 910-11. The Supreme Court, however, spoke only in terms
of performance of the contract as resulting in importation. 324 U.S. at 661. Whether
or not the existence of a remedy for non-performance against the foreign producer was
necessary was not stated.
In view of the Court's extensive analysis of the other aspects of the importation
transactions in Hooven & Allison, it is questionable that the lack of a remedy against
the foreign supplier would have prevented the Court from concluding that the company
was the importer. The Court had before it facts indicating that the brokers in the
case had at one time signed as principals not "for account of" their suppliers (supra),
but did not comment thereon. This lack of concern over the formal contract aspects
would appear to negate the importance attached by the court of appeal.
One other feature of the court of appeal's discussion of the contract aspects is puz-
zling. The court stated, in support of its contention that Volkswagen of America's
signing as "seller" and becoming "obligated" to VW is a significant fact, that should
the former not forward the order of VW, the automobiles and parts would not be
shipped. 90 Cal. Rptr. at 910. Whether Volkswagen of America acts as a principal-
seller or merely as an agent, its failure to forward an order has the same result: No
goods are shipped. Such a failure says nothing about the party's status as principal-
seller, agent, or purchaser. In addition, VW would have a breach of contract action
against Volkswagen of America in this situation, irrespective of the capacity in which
it acted, because of the existence of the franchise agreement between VW and Volks-
wagen of America.
118. This analysis does not mean, as the appellate court thought, that the customers
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Even if it were assumed that an intermediary's signing as "seller"
could be significant, to attach controlling importance to this factor
seems wholly misplaced. Volkswagen of America was stipulated to
be a subsidiary of the German manufacturer and was its franchised
sales agent. 119 The fact that it signed as "seller" would appear unim-
portant if a court were to recognize the reality of such a corporation's
function, namely, to coordinate a foreign manufacturer's United States
operation and to serve as a central domestic clearing house for or-
ders. 120 The existence of extensive sales of foreign-made consumer
goods, such as Volkswagen automobiles, was most likely non-existent
in 1945 when the Supreme Court decided Hooven & Allison, but the
test set forth by the Court has continued validity even in these changed
circumstances. The purpose of the test, to prevent the coastal import-
ing states from burdening the interior states with increased prices due
to the imposition of state taxes, 2' could be thwarted if it is said that
only one corporation, Volkswagen of America, is the "importer." If
the California court's theory were followed, the result would be that
states in which franchise holders other than VW are located could also
impose their own taxes. In a time when the American people com-
monly rely on the efforts of foreign manufacturers for goods and ma-
terials, 22 the contravention of the intent of the import-export clause
are the source of the order because they are part of the demand for the product. Ac-
cording to the court of appeal, the customer who orders a Volkswagen automobile from
a dealer could be considered the "inducing and efficient cause" of importation by the
following analysis: The dealer who orders from VW is VW's "sales agent," and VW,
which orders from Volkswagen of America, again is a "sales agent" of that firm. The
result would be, according to the court, an automobile reaching the customer free of
any local taxes, presumably because the customer would be the importer, shielded from
the tax by the many "sales agents" involved. 90 Cal. Rptr. at 911.
Obviously, someone bought rope from the Hooven & Allison company, and someone
bought steel from the warehouses in Socomet and Kenwal. In those cases, however,
the "inducing and efficient cause" test was applied only to the parties immediately in-
volved in the importation transactions, and in all three cases the party which compiled
and placed the order, not the one who forwarded it to the supplier, was held to
be the importer. See text accompanying notes 39, 56-57 and 60-61 supra. The court's
parade of horrors regarding the consequences of finding Volkswagen of America a mere
agent is not persuasive. If a case such as the court posited arose, the customer's claim
could be rejected summarily. The Hooven & Allison analysis was clearly intended to
apply to the parties actively involved in the immediate importation process, in a "nor-
mal course of business," and not an individual customer not involved in the original
transaction.
119. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
120. Id. See generally Hadari, The Structure of the Private Multinational Enter-
prise, 71 MICH. L. REv. 729, 748-51 (1973).
121. See note 2 supra; cf. 324 U.S. at 664.
122. A recent government publication lists over 600 foreigr owned subsidiaries and
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may assume proportions undreamed of by the framers of the constitu-
tion.12 3  Such a result seems likely when a court overlooks the essence
of the "inducing and efficient cause" test by ignoring the fact that
Volkswagen of America ordered goods only in response to requests
of its various franchise holders and, therefore, could not have initiated
the importation process. Thus, even assuming that the presence of
a sale between the intermediary and the purchaser is sometimes im-
portant, the California court's exclusive reliance on this form of trans-
action, in this case, demonstrates even more clearly the wisdom of the
Supreme Court in disregarding such factors.'24
2. Are "sellers" importers?
By failing to state the reasoning for its conclusion that Volkswagen
of America was the importer, aside from the unilluminating fact that
it acted as a "seller,"'1 5 and by failing to apply the Hooven & Allison
test with respect to Volkswagen of America's activity, the California
Supreme Court has confused the method by which importer identity is
determined. If the risk of loss played no part in the court's rationale
(and nothing in the opinion suggests it did),126 the effect of the supreme
court's summary dismissal of VW's Hooven & Allison argument is that
all "sellers" are importers, regardless of whether such designation is
a mere form. Even the most restricted reading of Hooven & Allison
could not support such a mechanical conclusion. The Court did not
state or imply that the "broker" situation was the sole instance where
the "inducing and efficient cause" test was applicable. That of course
was the situation in Hooven & Allison. However, the opinion made
clear that it was the totality of the transaction which influenced its
decision that the purchaser's contract was the cause of importation.
1 27
The respective legal statuses in which the parties act to cause the im-
portation should not have any bearing if the object of the analysis is
to determine who, in practical terms, without regard to the formalities
or technical procedures followed, caused goods to enter the country.'2
affiliates in this country, not counting those in finance or established solely for sales
and service. BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COM-
MERCE, FOREIGN DIREcT INVESTORS IN THE UNITED STATES: LIST OF FOREIGN FIRMS
WITH SOME INTEREST/CONTROL IN AMERICAN MANUFACTURING AND PETROLEUM COM-
PANIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1972).
123. See note 2 supra.
124. 324 U.S. at 663.
125. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
126. See text accompanying notes 95-105 supra.
127. See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra.
128. 324 U.S. at 663.
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As the Court concluded:
It is enough that the merchandise in this case was imported; and
-that petitioner [Hooven & Allison] was the efficient cause of its
importation, the purpose and effect of which was petitioner's acquisition
of the merchandise for its manufacture into finished goods. 129
IV. CONCLUSION
For importers using any but the most fundamental middle-man ar-
rangements, the Volkswagen decision confuses rather than clarifies
possible tax liability. If one were to take the court literally, importers
could evade the impact of the court's reasoning by simply arranging
the transaction so that intermediaries not sign as "sellers."'130 Permit-
ting the interpretation of the import-export clause to turn on such a
narrow, technical approach seems extremely unsatisfactory. An in-
formed and modernized use of the "inducing and efficient cause" test
of Hooven & Allison would clearly be the more appropriate method
of insuring uniformity of decision and providing a workable guide for
those engaged in international commerce.
Ferdie F. Franklin
129. Id. at 664. The court of appeal's determination that Porsche was an importer,
and the supreme court's apparent acquiescence therein (see note 86 supra), seems in
conflict with the major portion of the importer identity holding. VW performed serv-
ices for Porsche similar to those Volkswagen of America performed for VW. See text
accompanying notes 75-78 supra. The only essential difference was the lack of a for-
mal franchise relationship between Porsche and VW because of the former's direct
dealings with the manufacturer in making contracts. 90 Cal. Rptr. at 908-09. Porsche
was VW's sister corporation, and appeared subordinate to VW. It occupied the same
building as VW, and in other respects the two were very close. 7 Cal. 3d at 53-54,
496 P.2d at 1241, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 873. Despite this evidence of a much closer re-
lationship between VW and Porsche than between VW and Volkswagen of America,
the court still concluded there is an agency relationship and based its importer iden-
tity analysis on this conclusion. There is some consistency, though, because by decid-
ing the two relationships in this fashion, the court of appeal followed the formalistic
corporate structures involved, something the Kenwal, Socomet, and American Smelting
courts all refused to do in their interpretations of Hooven & Allison.
130. Interviews with attorneys for both sides in Volkswagen. indicated that Volks-
wagen of America had taken over the distribution of Volkswagen and Porsche automo-
biles and parts in the territory formerly given to VW and Porsche. This appears to
be part of a general nationwide policy on the part of the Volkswagen company, moti-
vated by general business considerations rather than in response to this particular case.
Interviews with Thomas Bonaventura, Assistant City Attorney, in Los Angeles, July
23, 1973, and Gerald Wolfson, attorney for VW, in Los Angeles, July 25, 1973.
